Conflict Across the Taiwan Straits?

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Conflict Across the Taiwan Straits?

• SOSC 228

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• Independence is something Taiwan has but cant
  talk about Reunification is something China
  cant have, but Taiwan must talk about all the
  time
• - a long time observer

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Main Points

1. Terribly dangerous place, with major role for
   great power conflicts, nationalism,
   misperceptions between the US and China, major
   impact of political economy, and role of
   leadership (generations).
2. Long history of conflict between KMT and CCP
3. Time may not be on the side of a peaceful
   resolution of the conflict given trends towards
   greater sense of Taiwan identity.
4. A three-sided game, not a bilateral game. Taiwan
   able to manipulate the U.S. and act as a
   wild-card in influencing U.S.-China relations.

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History of Conflict

• Taiwan pulled from China in 1895 by Japanese at
  end of Sino-Japanese War.
• Historical legacy of the Korean War. U.S. had put
  Taiwan outside its security perimeter, and Mao
  would have been able to take Taiwan in summer of
  1950 when it had planned an invasion.
• Several offshore island conflicts at which time
  Mao used the bombing of the islands to try to
  press the U.S. not to strengthen ties with Taiwan
• Failure of the 1954-55 efforts to stop U.S. from
  giving Chiang Kai-shek a security treaty. He got
  one.
• 1995-1996, most recent effort by China to use
  military force to influence politics.
• 1995, President Lee visits Cornell
  Universityfirst visit by KMT leader to US in
  over 20 years.
• 1996, PRC tried to influence presidential
  elections.

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Strategic Factors

• A. The Military Balance
• Taiwan has deterrence power against an invasion
  and implicit commitment from the U.S. to defend
  it from attack from mainland.
• PRC could launch an embargo or shoot missiles at
  Taiwan and stop the flow of goods in Kaohsiung,
  one of the busiest harbours in East Asia.
• U.S. continues to sell defensive weapons to
  maintain Taiwanese ability to prevent PRC
  invasion.

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Strategic Factors (cont)

• B. Role of the United States
• Critical role here for the U.S., which has a
  domestic lawthe Taiwan Relations Act of 10 April
  1979which commits the US to protect the security
  of the people of Taiwan.
• But not a mutual defense treaty, which was
  abrogated by President Carter in 1979.
• Despite the lack of diplomatic relations with
  Taiwan, that law has forced U.S. to support
  Taiwan diplomatically and militarily.
• U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity, whereby the
  U.S. does not want to guarantee Taiwan that U.S.
  will defend it if it declares independence--would
  give Taiwan incentive to declare independence
• But U.S. does not want China to think that it
  will not defend Taiwan if China attacksthat
  would decrease risks to China of attacking Taiwan.

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Strategic Factors (cont)

• B. Role of the United States
• The almost victory of coercive diplomacythe
  launching of missiles by China forced the US to
  put great pressure on Taiwan to negotiate, as the
  USA wanted to avoid a war with China.
• The strategy seemed to work as a succession of US
  foreign policy officials went to Taiwan in
  1997-98 and told Taiwan to return to the
  negotiating table.
• Lee Teng-hui, realizing this, chose to launch is
  two state theory to end the pressure.
• Hard to say what US would do if PRC tried to take
  the Offshore Islands todayunlikely to do much.
• Enhanced Security agreement between U.S. and
  Japan includes areas adjacent to JapanPRC sees
  this as guaranteeing Japanese involvement in
  Taiwan independence.

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Leadership Factors

• Jiang Zemins desire not to allow greater
  separation to emerge during his rule.
• Closely linked to his own image of being Deng
  Xiaopings successorDeng brought Hong Kong and
  Macao back,
• Jiang wants to begin the process of reunification
  with Taiwan.
• Returned from U.S. visit in October 1998, with
  idea of strategic partnership with the U.S. and
  began to mobilize the country for reunification.
• Chinese accuse Lee Teng-hui of really being
  Japanese, venomous attacks on him personally
• Lee Teng-hui wants to leave is own legacy
• Strongly committed to independence if possible
  (based on interview with him in April 1999)
• Very independent leader, very hard to control.

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Role of Domestic Politics

• A. Politics in Taiwan
• Development of Taiwan consciousness has grown
  dramatically under the political liberalization
  of past 13 years.
• 55 of Taiwanese identify themselves as Taiwanese
• percent identifying as Chinese drops from 41 to
  30 in 1994-97 down to 12 by October 1998
• 52 see China and Taiwan as tow separate
  countries.
• PRC use of force increases opposition to
  reunification.

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Role of Domestic Politics (cont)

• A. Politics in Taiwan
• Perceptions of mainland as having mistreated
  Taiwanese for much of the past 50 years.
• Most people in Taiwan prefer independence, but
  know that it is not possible, so in surveys call
  for the status quo
• Taiwan as a democratic system, the government
  must try to win elections over the DPP, which
  forces it to press for greater international
  stature and independence.
• For 1996 presidential elections, Lee Teng-hui
  needed to weaken the role of the DPP, so he moved
  closer towards independence.

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Role of Domestic Politics (cont)

• B. Politics in China
• Taiwan seen as vestige of imperialism,
  colonialism and weakness of China during the
  century of humiliation.
• Mainland refuses to recognize the popular views
  in Taiwan.
• No Chinese leader could stay in power if he let
  Taiwan go.
• PLA would not let Taiwan go on its own, but 1996
  missile attack may have been result of Jiang
  Zemins anger at U.S. decision to give Lee
  Teng-hui a visa to visit Cornell after he had
  been promised it would not occur.
• Chinese see U.S. position on Taiwan aimed at
  containing China and undermining its great
  power status.

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Role of Domestic Politics (cont)

• C. Politics in the U.S.
• U.S. public opinionare Americans willing to
  fight to defend Taiwan? No, see table--
• How would they like to see the problem solved?
  Both sides should solve it on their ownsee
  table--
• Yet Americans perceptions of Taiwan are much
  more positive than their perceptions of Chinasee
  table
• But president would have a hard time resisting
  Congressional pressure to defend Taiwan if it
  were attacked without declaring independence
• Congressional independence on this issue
  difficult for US presidents to manage.

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Political Economy

• Economic power of Taiwan plays an important role
  in helping Taiwan pull awaybuy votes in the UN,
  great respect for Taiwan in the West for its
  economic success.
• Search for cheap labour and access to mainland
  domestic market creates dependency on China and
  undermines KMT efforts to keep Taiwan separate.
• Yu Taifua web of deepening, asymmetric economic
  ties.
• Enormous growth in Taiwanese investment in China,
  perhaps as much as US 25 billion (HK200
  billion).

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Conclusion

• Misperceptions before 1996 resolved
• U.S. would not use force to defend Taiwan
• China would not use force to attack Taiwan if it
  moved towards greater independence.
• But 1999, shows that even with greater clarity,
  Taiwan can still act to create potential conflict
  between U.S. and PRC.