Prepoved kartelnih sporazumov,

1
Prepoved kartelnih sporazumov,

• sklepov združenj in usklajenega delovanja (81 PES)

2
Struktura 81. clena 1. odst.

• Vsebuje prepoved sodelovanja (collusion) ki ima
  za posledico
• .
• navaja tipicne primere

3
Struktura 81. clena

• 2. Odst sankcija-
• avtomaticno nicnost (delna nicnost ECJ)
• 3. odst - izjeme
• 1. odst. se ne uporablja za sporazume, ki
  izpolnjujejo 4 pogoje (2, 2-)
• pozitivnih ucinkov vec kot negativnih

4
81 PES

• 1. Kot nezdružljivi s skupnim trgom so
  prepovedani vsi sporazumi med podjetji, sklepi
  podjetniških združenj in usklajena ravnanja, ki
  bi lahko prizadeli trgovino med državami
  clanicami in katerih cilj oziroma posledica je
  preprecevanje, omejevanje ali izkrivljanje
  konkurence na skupnem trgu, zlasti tisti, ki

5

• a) neposredno ali posredno dolocajo nakupne ali
  prodajne cene ali druge pogoje poslovanja
• b) omejujejo ali nadzorujejo proizvodnjo, trge,
  tehnicni razvoj ali naložbe
• c) dolocajo razdelitev trgov in virov nabave
• d) uvajajo neenake pogoje za primerljive posle z
  drugimi trgovinskimi partnerji in jih tako
  postavljajo v podrejen konkurencni položaj
• e) pogojujejo sklepanje pogodb s tem, da
  sopogodbeniki sprejmejo dodatne obveznosti, ki po
  svoji naravi ali glede na trgovinske obicaje
  nimajo nikakršne zveze s predmetom takšnih pogodb.

6
Sankcija

• 2. Vsi sporazumi ali sklepi, ki jih ta clen
  prepoveduje, so nicni.

7
Izjeme

• 3. V naslednjih primerih se lahko doloci, da se
  dolocbe odstavka 1 ne uporabljajo za
• - sporazume ali skupine sporazumov med podjetji,
• - sklepe ali skupine sklepov podjetniških
  združenj,
• - usklajeno ravnanje ali skupine usklajenih
  ravnanj, ki prispevajo k izboljšanju proizvodnje
  ali distribucije blaga oziroma k pospeševanju
  tehnicnega ali gospodarskega napredka, pri cemer
  zagotavljajo potrošnikom pravicen delež doseženih
  koristi, in ki
• a) zadevnim podjetjem ne dolocajo omejitev, ki za
  doseganje teh ciljev niso nujne
• b) takšnim podjetjem glede znatnega dela zadevnih
  izdelkov ne dajejo možnosti izkljucitve
  konkurence.

8
Consten Grundig

• Consten je bil ekskluzivni distributer
  Grundigovih izdelkov v Franciji. Prav takoje imel
  ekskluzivno pravico v Franciji uporabljati
  Grundigovo blagovno znamko GINT (Grundig
  International). V skladu s pogodbo Consten ni
  smel prodajati konkurencnih izdelkov drugih
  proizvajalcev. Komisija je odlocila, da pogodba
  med Constenom in Grundigom krši 81. clen PES.
  Consten je vložil pravno sredstvo pri SES.

9
Consten Grundig
Grundig
Consten
G
D2
D1
D1
ND1
D1
ND2
ND
D3
ND3
D4
10
Namen 81. clena PES

• Prepoved omejevalnih sporazumov, sklepov,
  usklajenih ravnanj
• Horizontalnih
• Vertikalnih

11
Sporazumi, sklepi in usklajena delovanja

• The list in Article 81(1) of the Treaty is
  intended to apply to all collusion between
  undertakings, whatever the form it takes. There
  is continuity between the cases listed. The only
  essential thing is the distinction between
  independent conduct, which is allowed, and
  collusion, which is not, regardless of any
  distinction between types of collusion.

12
Bistvo kartelne prepovedi
Koordinacija (collusion)
Neodvisno ravnanje
13
Elementi generalne klavzule

• Dve ali vec samostojnih podjetij
• Podjetniško združenje
• Koordinacija (collusion) v obliki sporazuma,
  sklepa ali usklajenega ravnanja
• Namen ali ucinek je preprecevanje omejevanje ali
  izkrivljanje konkurence
• Znaten vpliv na konkurenco
• Znaten vpliv na trgovino med DC

14
Sporazum

• the concept of an agreement within the meaning
  of Article 81(1) of the Treaty centres around the
  existence of a concurrence of wills between at
  least two parties, the form in which it is
  manifested being unimportant so long as it
  constitutes the faithful expression of the
  parties' intention. (Bayer AG v Commission)

15
Sporazum

• Pojem ni enak kot v civilnem pravu
• Najmanj 2 subjekta
• Skupna volja glede preprecevanja
• Formalni ali neformalni

16
Sporazum

• Lahko izjaja iz SPP
• Pravila poslovnih/trgovskih združenj
• Zadostuje tudi gentlemen's agreement (Quinine).
• Ni treba, da je pravno zavezujoc,
• Npr. žepotekel a se še spoštuje
• Oblika ni važna, lahko se obstoj destilira iz
  okolišcin.
• Lahko se na obstoj sklepa na podlagi daljšega
  poslovnega odnosa med strankama.

17
Ni sporazum

• Dogovor znotraj skupin podjetij (koncerni)
• Pristna zastopniška pogodba
• Kolektivna pogodba o zaposlitvi

18
Complex arrangement

• Polypropylene
• Single continuing agreement
• The undertakings have expressed their joint
  intention to conduct themselves in the market in
  a specific way.

19
ECJ - Anic

• "When ... the infringement involves
  anticompetitive agreements and concerted
  practices, the Commission must in particular,
  show that the undertaking intended to contribute
  by its own conduct to the common objectives
  pursued by all the participants and that it was
  aware of the actual conduct planned or put into
  effect by other undertakings in pursuit of the
  same objectives or that it could reasonably have
  foreseen it and that it was prepared to take the
  risk."

20
Samostojno ravnanje in sporazum

• ECJ The only essential thing is the distinction
  between independent conduct, which is allowed,
  and collusion, which is not...
• Prilagajanje drugim
• Sledenje vodilnemu na trgu
• Sandoz export prohibited
• Dozdevno samostojno ravnanje se lahko šteje za
  del pogodbenega razmerja (AEG)
• Eksplicitna ali implicitna privolitev (Bayer)

21
AEG

• A refusal by a manufacturer to approve
  distributors who satisfy the qualitative criteria
  of his system of selective distribution does not
  constitute, on the part of the undertaking,
  unilateral conduct On the contrary, such an
  attitude forms part of the contractual relations
  between the undertaking and resellers, since the
  admission of a distributor is based on the
  acceptance, tacit or express, by the contracting
  parties of the policy pursued by the undertaking,
  which requires inter alia the exclusion from the
  network of distributors who are qualified for
  admission but are not prepared to adhere to that
  policy.

22
Association of undertakings

• Not limited to particular type (e,g, trade
  associations)
• Legal personality not important
• Only important that it has influence on the
  market behaviour of its members
• BNIC, v Guy Clair Case 123/83

23
Sklepi združenj podjetij

• Ni omejitve na dolocene tipe
• Trgovska združenja
• Poklicna združenja (odvetniška zbornica)
• Ni potrebna pravna osebnost
• Ni potreben formalni statut

24
BNIC v. Guy Clair

• Article 81 of the Treaty applies to agreements
  between undertakings and decisions by
  associations of undertakings. The legal framework
  within which such agreements are made and such
  decisions are taken and the classification given
  to that framework by the various national legal
  systems are irrelevant as far as the
  applicability of the community rules on
  competition are concerned. An inter-trade
  agreement made by two groups of traders must
  therefore be regarded as an agreement between
  undertakings or associations of undertakings
  within the meaning of Article 81 even if they
  meet within an organization which the national
  courts have held to be governed by public law.

25
Sklep združenja podjetij

• Sklep o dolocitvi rabata
• Ni potrebna formalna veljavnost oz. obveza
• Vpliv na ravnanje clanov!
• Neobvezijoca priporocila glede cen (Fenex)
• Tudi ce dolocitev cen naloži/odobri država
• Certifikati (SCK FNK)
• Tudi statut je lahko sklep

26
Kazen

• Združenje
• Posamezni clani

27
Usklajeno ravnanje (UR)

• Enako/podobno ravnanje na trgu
• Lahko neformalno sodelovanje
• Skrivanje, unicenje dokazov
• Razlika med usklajenim ravnanjem in naravno
  reakcijo na tržne razmere
• Razlicni proizvodni stroški

28
Odnos med sporazumi, sklepi in UR - ECJ

• The list in Article 81(1) of the Treaty is
  intended to apply to all collusion between
  undertakings, whatever the form it takes.
• There is continuity between the cases listed.
• The only essential thing is the distinction
  between independent conduct, which is allowed,
  and collusion, which is not, regardless of any
  distinction between types of collusion.

29
Definicija - ECJ Dyestuffs (ICI)

• a form of coordination between undertakings
  which, without having reached the stage where an
  agreement properly so-called has been concluded,
  knowingly substitutes practical cooperation
  between them for the risks of competition.

30
ECJ (Sugar Cartel) The concept of a 'concerted
practice' refers to

• a form of coordination between undertakings
• without having been taken to the stage where an
  agreement properly so-called has been concluded,
• knowingly substitutes for the risks of
  competition,
• practical cooperation between them
• which leads to conditions of competition which do
  not correspond to the normal conditions of the
  market,
• having regard to the nature of the products, the
  importance and number of the undertakings as well
  as the size and nature of the said market.

31
Cimenteries CBR v. Commission

• Any direct or indirect contact between economic
  operators
• of such a nature as to disclose to a competitor
  the course of conduct which they themselves have
  decided to adopt or contemplate adopting on the
  market constitutes a concerted practice where
  the object or effect of such contact is to create
  conditions of competition which do not correspond
  to the normal conditions of the market in
  question.

32
Dokaz UR

• In order to prove that there has been a concerted
  practice, it is not therefore necessary to show
  that a trader has formally undertaken to adopt a
  particular course of conduct or that the
  competitors have colluded over their future
  conduct on the market.
• It is sufficient that, by its statement of
  intention, the trader eliminated or, at the very
  least, substantially reduced uncertainty as to
  the conduct to expect of it on the market.

33
Vertikalna razmerja (Pioneer)

• A company whose purpose is to import and
  organize the sale of products in several Member
  States and which to that end attempts to find a
  distributor in each of the Member States in
  question, offers it an exclusive distributorship
  agreement, divides the products imported amongst
  the national distributors
• and seeks to coordinate their sales efforts,
  inter alia by holding regular meetings, is
  obliged, on account of its central position, to
  display particular vigilance in order to prevent
  concerted practices contrary to the competition
  rules, even if those activities do not
  necessarily confer on it a decisive influence on
  the conduct of each of the distributors.

34
UR in dopustno naravno paralelno ravnanje

• Pri UR ni bistvo v razlikovanju med sporazumom in
  UR ampak v razlikovanju med UR in dopustnim
  paralelnim obnašanjem na trgu, ki ne nasprotuje
  konkurencnopravnim pravilom!!!
• Lahko problem v situaciji oligopola

35
Oligopol

• Malo prodajalcev
• Težko dostopen trg
• Malo diferenciacije proizvodov
• Transparentnost stroškov in cen
• Naravno nižanje cen
• Problem je struktura trga in ne ravnanje
  udeležencev

36
UR in paralelno ravnanje

• Conscious parallellism
• Sprejemljiva razlaga enakega/podobnega ravnanja
• ICI (Dyrestuffs)
• Sugar (Suiker Unie)
• Züchner v. Bayerische Bank provizije za transfer
  sredstev med DC
• Asturienne Rheinzink
• Woodpulp

37
ICI v Commission, case 48-69

• Although every producer is free to change his
  prices, taking into account the conduct of his
  competitors,
• it is contrary to the rules on competition for a
  producer to cooperate with his competitors,
• in order to determine a coordinated course of
  action relating to a price increase and
• to ensure its success by prior elimination of all
  uncertainty as to each other' s conduct regarding
  the essential elements of that action, such as
  the amount, subject-matter, date and place of the
  increases.

38
Suiker Unie (Sugar Cartel)

• " each economic operator must determine
  independently the policy which he intends to
  adopt on the common market including the choice
  of the persons and undertakings to which he makes
  offers or sells.
• this requirement of independence does not deprive
  economic operators of the right to adapt
  themselves intelligently to the existing and
  anticipated conduct of their competitors,

39
Suikerunie (Sugar Cartel)

• it does, however, strictly preclude any direct
  or indirect contact between such operators, the
  object or effect whereof is either to influence
  the conduct on the market of an actual or
  potential competitor or
• to disclose to such a competitor the course of
  conduct which they themselves have decided to
  adopt or contemplate adopting on the market..

40
Züchner v. Bayerische Bank -

• Ali so se stiki nanacali na provizije v
  preteklosti ali v prihodnosti?
• Ali bi bile provizije v situaciji konkurence
  razlicne?
• Število in pomen bank, ki so aktivne v
  transferjih denarja med DC
• Volumen transferjev kjer se je uporabila enotna
  tarifa v primerjavi s skupnim številom
  transferjev.

41
Cement

• Obljuba konkurentu, da ne bo konkuriral na
  dolocenem trgu
• Izmenjava info med konkurentoma na podlagi
  prošnje enega od njih
• did not make it inconceivable that the Italian
  undertaking, despite everything, allowed the
  information to influence its export prices".

42
Sprejemljiva drugacna razlaga ravnanja

• Asturienne Rheinzink
• Woodpulp

43
Woodpulp

• Parallel conduct cannot be regarded as
  furnishing proof of concertation unless
  concertation constitutes the only plausible
  explanation for such conduct
• Article 81 does not deprive economic operators
  of the right to adapt themselves intelligently to
  the existing and anticipated conduct of their
  competitors.
• necessary to ascertain whether the parallel
  conduct cannot, taking account of the nature of
  the products, the size and the number of the
  undertakings and the volume of the market in
  question, be explained otherwise than by
  concertation.

44

• it must be stated that, in this case,
  concertation is not the only plausible
  explanation for the parallel conduct.
• the system of price announcements may be regarded
  as constituting a rational response to the fact
  that the pulp market constituted a long-term
  market and to the need felt by both buyers and
  sellers to limit commercial risks.
• The similarity in the dates of price
  announcements may be regarded as a direct result
  of the high degree of market transparency.
• Finally, the parallelism of prices and the price
  trends may be satisfactorily explained by the
  oligopolistic tendencies of the market and by the
  specific circumstances prevailing in certain
  periods.
• Accordingly, the parallel conduct established by
  the Commission does not constitute evidence of
  concertation.

45
Karteli

• Dogovarjanje cen
• Quinine, Dystuffs (ICI), Cement Cartel, Sugar
  Cartel
• Omejitve proizvodnje/prodaje (kvote)
• Qinine, Belasco
• Delitev trgov (nacelo domacega trga)
• Cement Cartel, Peroxygen, SAS/Maersk
• Dogovarjanje glede ponudb na javnih razpisih (bid
  rigging)
• Heating pipes
• Omejevanje reklamiranja ipd.
• Milchforderungfonds
• Leniency

46
Zastopanje, distribucija, franchising, licenca

• Lastna distribucija ali vertikalna integracija,
• zastopanje,
• Pristno in nepristno zastopanje (alokacija
  rizikov)
• Distribuciske pogodbe
• Ekskluzivna distribucija (STM)
• Selektivni distribucijski sistemi (Metro, BMW)

47
Ekskluzivna distribucija (STM)

• it is appropriate to take into account in
  particular
• the nature and quantity, limited or otherwise, of
  the products covered by the agreement,
• the position and importance of the grantor and
  the concessionnaire on the market for the
  products concerned,
• the isolated nature of the disputed agreement or,
  alternatively, its position in a series of
  agreements,
• the severity of the clauses intended to protect
  the exclusive dealership or, alternatively,
• the opportunities allowed for other commercial
  competitors in the same products by way of
  parallel re-exportation and importation.

48
Selektivna distribucija Metro

• selective distribution system accords with
  Article 81(1), provided that
• resellers are chosen on the basis of objective
  criteria of a qualitative nature relating to
• technical qualifications of the reseller and his
  staff and
• the suitability of his trading premises and
• that such conditions are laid down uniformly for
  all potential resellers and are not applied in a
  discriminatory fashion.

49
Franchising

• Pronuptia, Yves Rocher
• Specificna skupinska izjema4087/88
• Sedaj splošna glede vertikalnih razmerij 2790/99

50
Namen ali ucinek - omejevanje konkurence

• Kaj je omejevanje konkurence?
• Horizontalne in vertikalne omejitve
• Absolutna teritorialna zašcita
• Tudi pozitivni ucinki
• Dva možna pristopa
• Široka razlaga 81/1 in uporaba možnosti izjem
• Ožja razlaga 81/1 in manj potrebe po izjemah

51
Namen ali ucinek omejevanje konkurence

• STM
• Alternativno
• ekskluzivne klavzule
• Consten Grundig
• hard core restrictions (omejitev per se)

52
Object or effect preventing, limiting or
distorting of competition
53
Object or effect (STM)

• The fact that these are not cumulative but
  alternative requirements, indicated by the
  conjunction 'or,' leads first to the need to
  consider the precise purpose of the agreement, in
  the economic context in which it is to be
  applied.
• Where, however, an analysis of the said clauses
  does not reveal the effect on competition to be
  sufficiently deleterious, the consequences of the
  agreement should then be considered and for it to
  be caught by the prohibition it is then necessary
  to find that those factors are present which show
  that competition had in fact been prevented or
  restricted or distorted to an appreciable extent.

54
Consten Grundig

• Since the agreement thus aims at isolating the
  French market for Grundig products and
  maintaining artificially, for products of a very
  well-known brand, separate national markets
  within the community, it is therefore such as to
  distort competition in the common market.
• It was therefore proper for the contested
  decision to hold that the agreement constitutes
  an infringement of Article 81(1). No further
  considerations, whether of economic data (price
  differences between France and Germany,
  representative character of the type of appliance
  considered
• and no possible favourable effects of the
  agreement in other respects, can in any way lead,
  in the face of the abovementioned restrictions,
  to a different solution under Article 81(1).

55
Economska analiza (STM)

• The competition in question must be understood
  within the actual context in which it would occur
  in the absence of the agreement in dispute.
• In particular it may be doubted whether there is
  an interference with competition if the said
  agreement seems really necessary for the
  penetration of a new area by an undertaking.
• Therefore, in order to decide whether an
  agreement containing a clause 'granting an
  exclusive right of sale' is to be considered as
  prohibited by reason of its object or of its
  effect, it is appropriate to take into account in
  particular

56

• the nature and quantity, limited or otherwise, of
  the products covered by the agreement,
• the position and importance of the grantor and
  the concessionaire on the market for the products
  concerned,
• the isolated nature of the disputed agreement,
  or, alternatively, its position in a series of
  agreements,
• the severity of the clauses intended to protect
  the exclusive dealership or, alternatively,
• the opportunities allowed for other commercial
  competitors in the same products by way of
  parallel re-exportation and importation. "

57
Omejitve per se - 81(1)

• a) neposredno ali posredno dolocajo nakupne ali
  prodajne cene ali druge pogoje poslovanja
• b) omejujejo ali nadzorujejo proizvodnjo, trge,
  tehnicni razvoj ali naložbe
• c) dolocajo razdelitev trgov in virov nabave
• d) uvajajo neenake pogoje za primerljive posle z
  drugimi trgovinskimi partnerji in jih tako
  postavljajo v podrejen konkurencni položaj
• e) pogojujejo sklepanje pogodb s tem, da
  sopogodbeniki sprejmejo dodatne obveznosti, ki po
  svoji naravi ali glede na trgovinske obicaje
  nimajo nikakršne zveze s predmetom takšnih
  pogodb.

58
Zadosten ucinek na konkurenco

• De minimis doktrina (Völk v. Vervaecke)
• Mreže sporazumov (network agreements (Brasserie
  De Haecht)
• Sporocilo Komisije 2001
• Horizontalni 10
• Vertikalni 15

59
Völk v. Vervaecke

• If an agreement is to be capable of affecting
  trade between member states it must be possible
  to foresee with a sufficient degree of
  probability on the basis of a set of objective
  factors of law or of fact
• that the agreement in question may have an
  influence, direct or indirect, actual or
  potential,
• on the pattern of trade between member states in
  such a way that it might hinder the attainment of
  the objectives of a single market between states.
  

60

• Those conditions must be understood by reference
  to the actual circumstances of the agreement.
  Consequently
• an agreement falls outside the prohibition in
  Article 81 when it has only an insignificant
  effect on the markets, taking into account the
  weak position which the persons concerned have on
  the market of the product in question.
• Thus an exclusive dealing agreement, even with
  absolute territorial protection, may, having
  regard to the weak position of the persons
  concerned on the market in the products in
  question in the area covered by the absolute
  protection, escape the prohibition laid down in
  article 81(1).

61
Mreže sporazumov

• Kumulativni ucinek
• Brasserie de Haecht
• Delimitis

62
Brasserie De Haecht kumulativni ucinki

• regard must be had to such effects in the
  context in which they occur, that is to say, in
  the economic and legal context of such
  agreements, decisions or practices and where they
  might combine with others to have a cumulative
  effect on competition.
• pointless to consider an agreement taken
  distinct from the market in which they are seen
  to operate

63

• Thus in order to examine whether it is caught by
  Article 81(1) an agreement cannot be examined
  in isolation from
• the factual or legal circumstances causing it to
  prevent, restrict or distort competition.
• The existence of similar contracts may be taken
  into consideration for this objective to the
  extent to which the general body of contracts of
  this type is capable of restricting the freedom
  of trade. ...
• The existence of similar contracts is a
  circumstance which, together with others, is
  capable of being a factor in the economic and
  legal context within which the contract must be
  judged.

64
ECJ in Delimitis

• ... the cumulative effect of several similar
  agreements constitutes one factor
• consequently, in the present case it is
  necessary to analyse the effect of a beer supply
  agreement, taken together with other contracts of
  the same type,
• on the opportunities of national competitors or
  those from other Member States, to gain access to
  the market for beer consumption or to increase
  their market share "

65
Ucinek na trgovino med DC
66
Cezmejna trgovina

• Razmejitev pristojnosti med ES in DC
• Minimalen cezmejni ucinek
• Sporocilo K 2004
• Tudi glede NUVK in sodišc
• Trgovina Zajema vsako ekonomsko aktivnost
• Vzorec trgovanja (pattern of trade) med DC
• Struktura trgovanja v ES (zlasti eliminacija
  gospodarskega subjekta)

67
Vzorec trgovanja (STM)

• it must be possible to foresee with a
  sufficient degree of probability on the basis of
  a set of objective factors of law or of fact that
  the agreement in question may have an influence,
  direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the
  pattern of trade between Member States.
• The influence thus foreseeable must give rise to
  a fear that the realization of a single market
  between Member States might be impeded.

68
Faktorji

• Faktorji, za katere posamicno ni nujno, da so
  odlocilni
• Narava sporazuma c.a.
• Narava proizvodov na katere se sporazum nanaša
• Položaj in pomen udeleženih podjetij

69
Povecanje volumna trgovanja

• Consten Grundig
• Ni pomembno

70
Delitev trgov

• Vertikalni sporazumi
• Teritorialne omejitve
• Prepoved prodaje zunaj teritorija
• Horizontalni sporazumi
• Sporazumi, ki se nanašajo na tretje države

71
Sporazumi glede ene DC

• Delimitis
• Ekskluziva in access clause
• Pronuptia
• Cementhandelaren (VCH)
• compartmentalisation

72
Pronuptia

• " . .. distribution franchise agreements which
  contain clauses effecting a partitioning of
  markets between franchisor and franchisees or
  between franchisees are per se capable of
  affecting trade between Member States, even if
  they are concluded between enterprises
  established in the same Member State,
• to the extent that they prevent the franchisees
  from setting themselves up in another Member
  State."

73
Cementhandelaren

• An agreement extending over the whole of the
  territory of a Member State by its very nature
  has the effect of reinforcing the
  compartmentalization of markets on a national
  basis...
• in particular, the by the association on all
  sales to resellers who are not authorized by it
  make it more difficult for producers or sellers
  from other Member States to be active in or
  penetrate the Netherlands market.

74
Sankcija 81(2) PES

• Nicnost ex lege
• Možnost delne nicnosti (nac. pravo)
• Consten Grundig
• Odškodninski in opustitveni zahtevki (private
  enforcement)

75
Namen izjem po 81/3

• Interpretacija 81/1
• Proti- in prokonkurencni vidiki sporazuma
• Ucinkovitost
• Boljši produkti, nižje cene
• Tehtanje
• Socialno-politicni faktorji (kontekst)

76
4 pogoji iz 81/3

• Kumulativno
• Dokazno breme podjetje
• Navodila Komisije OJ (2004) C101/97

77
Izjeme po 3. odstavku 81. clena

• Prispevek k napredku proizvodnje ali distribucije
  blaga ali k promociji tehnicnega ali
  gospodarskega napredka
• Omogocanje poštenega deleža ugodnosti potrošnikom
• Pogodba ne sme naložiti podjetjem omejitev, ki
  niso nujne
• Pogodba ne sme podjetjem omogociti možnosti za
  izkljucitev konkurence glede znatnega dela
  proizvodov
• Kumulativno!!

78
Prispevek k napredku proizvodnje ali distribucije
blaga ali k promociji tehnicnega ali
gospodarskega napredka

• Povecanje ucinkovitosti
• Volkswagen/Ford
• Synthetic fibres
• Drugi ucinki
• Zaposlovanje in sociala
• Volkswagen/Ford
• Okolje
• Exxon/Shell

79
Pošten delež potrošnikom

• Širok pojem potrošnikov (odjemalci)
• Vsaj kompenzirati negativne ucinke sporazuma
• Kriterij ni bil izpolnjen
• VBBB VBVB
• SPO and Others v. Commission

80
Nujnost omejitve

• Dvojni test
• Nujen sporazum kot tak
• Nujne tudi posamezne omejitve
• Ali se cilj lahko bolj ucinkovito oseže z
  omejitvami konkurence
• hard core restrictions naceloma ne izpolnjujejo

81
Omejitev ne izkljucuje konkurence

• Varovanje konkurence ima prednost pred evt.
  pozitivnimi ucinki
• Analiza ucinkov omejitev (Navodila Komisije)

82
Uporaba izjem

• Do 1.4.2004
• Odloca Komisija (CFI in ECJ)
• Ovezna priglasitev
• Po reformi
• Odlocajo nacionalni uradi (nacionalna sodišca)
• Lahko tudi Komisija
• Ni vec priglasitve

83
Odlocbe Komisije - stari sistem

• Comfort letter (neformalna poravnava)
• Zacasna odlocba
• Negativni izvid (negative clearance)
• Ugotovitev kršitve
• Individualna izjema
• Skupinska izjema (uredba)

84
Odlocbe Komisije - novi sistem

• Ugotovitev kršitve
• Sprejem zaveze podjetja
• Odlocba o uporabi ali neuporabi 81/1 ali 82 clena
  ali izpolnjevanju pogojev 8/3 clena clena glede
  dolocenih vrst sporazumov
• Skupinska izjema (uredba)

85
Nacionalni organi odlocitve (5. clen)

• Zahtevajo prenehanje kršitve
• Izdajo zacasne ukrepe
• Sprejemajo zaveze
• Nalagajo kazni

86
Nacionalna sodišca

• Sporazum omejuje konkurenco (81/1
• Sporazum izpolnjuje kriterije po 81/3
• Sporazum je nicen (81/2 clen)

87
Skupinske izjeme

• Uredbe Komisije (izjemoma Svet)
• Delimitis (vloga nacionalnih sodišc)