Predbe

1
Predbežný nástin prícin velké financní krize

• Miroslav Zámecník
• 21.10.2008

2
Koreny, aneb kdo za to muže?

• Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (za Cartera),
  následne Clinton a Kongres nátlakem na Fannie Mae
  a Freddie Mac (vládou sponzorované instituce na
  podporu dostupného vlastnického bydlení- odkupy
  hypoték a cenných papíru financujících hypotéky)-
  soucást problému, nikoli hlavní prícina, protože
  úkolem kolem regulatorních orgánu bylo to
  determine if the institution has met the credit
  needs of its entire community in a manner
  consistent with safe and sound operations tedy v
  souladu se zásadami obezretného podnikání.
• Lloyd Bentsen k CRA (první Clintonuv ministr
  financí) "The only thing that ought to matter
  on a loan application is whether or not you can
  pay it back, not where you live.
• Verdikt Bernankeho k CRA (2007) Managers of
  financial institutions found that these loan
  portfolios, if properly underwritten and managed,
  could be profitable" and that the loans "usually
  did not involve disproportionately higher levels
  of default".
• In a Bank for International Settlements ("BIS")
  working paper, economist Luci Ellis concluded
  that "there is no evidence that the Community
  Reinvestment Act was responsible for encouraging
  the subprime lending boom and subsequent housing
  bust."56
• According to Janet L. Yellen, President of the
  Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
  independent mortgage companies made "high-priced
  loans" at more than twice the rate of the banks
  and thrifts most CRA loans were responsibly
  made, and were not the higher-priced loans that
  have contributed to the current crisis.62

3
Jestliže ne CRA, tak Fannie Mae?

• Assistant Professor of Law Alan M. White64
  notes that some abuses blamed on CRA actually
  occurred under the George W. Bush administration,
  because the Housing and Urban Development and
  Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
  allowed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to fulfill
  their affordable housing goals which are not
  technically part of the CRA by buying subprime
  mortgage-backed securities.65
• In 1997, First Union Capital Markets and Bear,
  Stearns Co launched the first publicly
  available securitization of CRA loans, issuing
  384.6 million of such securities.18 These
  public offerings had so much appeal they were
  several times oversubscribed by money managers
  and insurance companies who were not buying them
  for CRA credit.19 Between 2000 and 2002 the
  government sponsored enterprise the Federal
  National Mortgage Association, commonly known as
  Fannie Mae, securitized 394 billion in CRA loans
  with 20 billion going to securitized
  mortgages."20 In 2000, in order to expand the
  secondary market for affordable community-based
  mortgages and to increase liquidity for
  CRA-eligible loans, Fannie Mae committed to
  purchase and securitize 2 billion of
  "MyCommunityMortgage" loans.2122 In 2007 Ben
  Bernanke suggested further increasing the
  presence of Sallie Mae and Freddie Mac (the
  Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation which
  increases secondary markets) in the affordable
  housing market to help banks fulfill their CRA
  obligations by providing them with more
  opportunities to securitize CRA-related
  loans.23
• In 2003, researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank
  of New York noted that dramatic changes in the
  financial services landscape had weakened the
  CRA, and that in 2003 less than 30 percent of
  all home purchase loans were subject to intensive
  review under the CRA.33

4
A co FED a regulátori?

• "The degree of monetary tightening that would
  be required to contain or offset a bubble of any
  substantial dimension appears to be so great as
  to risk an unacceptable amount of collateral
  damage to the wider economy," former Fed Chairman
  Alan Greenspan said in 2002.
• Part of the problem was that the Fed applied the
  lessons of the dot-com bubble to housing and
  credit, says Harvard University economist Jeremy
  Stein. When Internet stock prices collapsed in
  2000, the economic fallout was contained, because
  the use of leverage -- borrowing money to magnify
  bets -- was limited. The housing market is far
  more dependent on credit, and therefore leverage.
  As the issuance of mortgages expanded, and
  investors plunged money into complex securities
  based on those loans, matters got dangerously out
  of hand.
• "Monetary policy, for which we in the Federal
  Reserve are responsible, is a blunt instrument
  with economy-wide effects," said Federal Reserve
  Bank of Minneapolis President Gary Stern. "We
  should not pretend that actions taken to rein in
  those asset-price increases, which seemingly
  outstrip economic fundamentals, won't in the
  short run curtail to some extent economic growth
  and employment.
• In 2000, derivatives were exempted from all
  regulatory, supervisory or reserve requirements
  by the Commodity Futures Modernisation Act.
• From 2002-07, the Alan Greenspan Federal Reserve
  chose not to supervise new mortgage-lending
  firms.
• In 2004, the SEC granted net capitalisations
  exemptions to five firms. This exemption allowed
  banks to ignore traditional debt-to-net capital
  ratio previously a modest 12-to-1 ratio. After
  the 2004 exemption, firms levered up as much as
  40-to-1. Its not surprising that the five
  brokers that received this exemption Goldman
  Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Bear
  Stearns and Morgan Stanley are no longer in
  existence they either failed, merged or changed
  into depository banks.
• The Greenspan decision not to supervise mortgage
  lenders led directly to the new lending standard
  . During that five-year period (2002-07), the
  basis for making mortgages was NOT the borrowers
  ability to repay rather, it was the lender's
  ability to sell mortgages to a third party who
  securitised and resold them.

5
Regulatorní arbitráž a její dusledky

• Competitive markets are ruthlessly efficient at
  finding the most cost-effective way to generate
  the highest returns. The mortgage originations
  that were least likely to default in 90 days were
  the now notorious 2/28 ARMs. These loans had
  cheap teaser rates that lasted for 24 months, and
  then reset to a higher, market-based rate. By
  month seven, the originator had zero concern as
  to whether the mortgage defaulted or not.
• Disciplinující funkce trhu se bohužel projevila
  až tím, že vetšina tohoto typu poskytovatelu
  hypoték, asi 300, podala návrh na prohlášení
  konkursu.
• Záver takto vládou manipulovaný (CRA, FannieMae,
  Freddie Mac a spol), regulovaný-neregulovaný
  (provokující regulatorní arbitráže), perverzními
  stimuly nasycený, díky financním inovacím vysoce
  komplexní (sekuritizace, CDO, CDS etc.) a masívne
  napákovaný trh se zhroutil.