United Nations Peace Keeping Reform

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United Nations Peace Keeping Reform

• By Jason Elangbam, Jun Hong, Alexander Loyal, and
  Joshua Loyal
• (As in Alphabetical Order)

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History

• First peacekeeping mission 1948, called the
  United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
  Responsible to keep peace between Israel and Arab
  states.
• The idea of modern UN peacekeeping was
  established after the Suez Crisis by Lester
  Pearson in 1956. This proposal used the forces of
  many countries to quell fears that the peace
  keeping troops would be one-sided.
• After the cold war ended in 1991, the
  peacekeeping missions became more complex and
  helped out other conflicts.
• Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) was
  established in 1992
• There were many failures after this, sending out
  too few forces to new zones and had no political
  backing Including both the Rwandan and Bosnian
  genocide.
• Currently there are 114 nations donating troops

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Criteria for Successful Peacekeeping

• Personnel- Increase the capacity of the current
  peacekeeping force, ideally with additional
  troops from the Northern countries.
• The Ability to Restore Basic Services of
  Government- some proposals were for the UN to
  provide personnel to aid organizations such as
  the judiciary.
• Law and Order and the Elections and Restoration
  of Democracy- For peace talks to be feasible the
  country must have legitimacy in its government
  and elections.
• Collective Action- Includes institutions, like
  the UN, which would act as a forum for
  international players to work out a common
  strategy for countries emerging from conflict, to
  ensure they do not lapse back into war.

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Overview of Current Situation

• Because the UN has no standing force or supplies,
  it must form ad hoc coalitions for various
  missions.
• Relying on inchoate coalitions holds both the
  possibility for failure to form a suitable force,
  and is a general slowdown for intervention.
• Those who volunteer troops tend to be mostly
  developing nations, which cannot always provide
  the exact number of troops needed for successful
  peace keeping in multiple areas.
• Because UN Peacekeeping troops are contributed by
  many nations, some have argued that there are
  cultural incompatibilities amongst peacekeeping
  troops, which must be overcome in order to
  effectively complete their assigned task.
• As of now, there is no independent UN army
• Peacekeepers were not at first expected to ever
  fight. As a general rule, they were deployed when
  ceasefire was in place and the parties to the
  conflict had given their consent. They were
  deployed to observe from the ground and reported
  impartially on adherence to the ceasefire, troop
  withdrawal or other elements of the peace
  agreement. This gave time and breathing space for
  diplomatic efforts to address the underlying
  causes of conflict.

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Perspectives on PK Operations

• Quotation by Rome Dalliare, force commander in
  Rwanda during genocide,
• He told me the UN was a 'pull' system, not a
  'push' system like I had been used to with NATO,
  because the UN had absolutely no pool of
  resources to draw on. You had to make a request
  for everything you needed, and then you had to
  wait while that request was analyzed...For
  instance, soldiers everywhere have to eat and
  drink. In a push system, food and water for the
  number of soldiers deployed is automatically
  supplied. In a pull system, you have to ask for
  those rations, and no common sense seems to ever
  apply.
• Quotation by Department of Peace-Keeping
  Operations, Under-Secretary General Jean-Marie
  Guehenno has voiced concern in stating,
• The provision of well-equipped, well-trained
  and disciplined military and police personnel to
  UN peacekeeping operations is a collective
  responsibility of Member States. Smaller
  Countries should not and must not be expected
  to shoulder this burden alone.

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Previously Proposed Plans

• The Brahimi Report- The Brahimi Report attempted
  to recap former peacekeeping missions, isolate
  flaws, and take steps to patch mistakes to ensure
  the efficiency of futures peacekeeping missions.
• March 15th, 2007- Proposal to restructure the UN
  Peacekeeping department. The proposals main
  provision was to set up the Department of Field
  Support.
• The Department of Field Support- would allow for
  faster decision making on the ground, and would
  provide services such as logistics and
  intelligence for troops in the field.
• Rapid reaction force- Many United Nations
  administrators believe that the ad-hoc style of
  peacekeeping operations inevitably fails because
  of deployment and mandate delay when global
  crises occur. One suggestion to account for these
  delays is a rapid reaction force a standing
  group, administered by the UN and deployed by the
  UN Security Council, that receives its troops and
  support from current Security Council members and
  is ready for quick deployment in the event of
  future genocides.

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Our Goals

• Help to further generate and diversify
  peace-keeping troops. (PKT)
• Modify the training system to include cultural
  training
• Create a more efficient and a quicker response to
  global crisis.

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Plan

• Creation of Pool System- from which countries are
  selected to provide Rapid Response Force and
  reserve troops.
• New forces, Rapid Response Force and Reserve
  Force, would be created.
• Countries in the pool system which are not
  selected to provide troops would be responsible
  for funding and supplies.
• When conflict occurs and UN Security Council
  decides peace keeping operation is necessary, the
  Rapid Response Force will be dispatched
  immediately to the area, replaced by the
  Volunteer Force, which can be reinforced by the
  Reserves
• New pool would be decided by the specific
  department according to certain standards
  considering each countrys economic and military
  power with the time interval of 10 years.

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Pool System

• By specific economic, military, and international
  contribution standards set by the Office of
  Country Selection (OCS), 20 nations would be
  selected.
• OCS then selects, 3 nations to provide troops for
  Rapid Response Force, 3 nations to provide troops
  for Reserved Force.
• Countries that do not wish to be in the pool can
  opt to not to participate in expense of 0.1 of
  their annual budget.
• Number of such countries would be limited to 8.
  After first 8 have paid their cost, no more
  payment related to withdrawal from the pool shall
  be accepted.
• Those in a time of conflict will not be forced to
  enter the pool, nor will they have to pay a
  penalty to stay out

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Pool System (Continued)

• 6 nations that are selected by OCS to provide
  troops for either forces shall have the
  responsibility for 2 years. After 2 years, 6
  nations would be newly selected by, and no nation
  that provided troops for either forces shall
  provide the troops for the next 2 years, so that
  every nation would have at least one chance to
  participate.
• Countries that are awaiting their deployment will
  be trained by designated representatives.
• Money from the penalties paid by countries who
  opted out shall be used to fund the troops and
  reward the 6 nations that provide the troops.
  Ratio of the fund to the reward would be 46, and
  the reward would be divided proportionally
  according to each nations contribution. This
  will also prevent the UN from having to
  drastically change its budget.
• After 10 years, OCS shall choose another pool.
  However, the old pool remains for 12 years so
  that the countries in the new pool would have 2
  years for training. Nations that are not in the
  pool would be highly recommended to fund the
  nations in the pool with 0.1 of their annual
  budget.
• Any country that serves more than other countries
  shall receive additional compensation. OCS shall
  decide the amount and method of reward.

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UN Rapid Response Force (UNRRF)

• Use of UNRRF buys time for reserve and volunteer
  force to be properly educated depending on the
  culture of the area of conflict.
• A relatively small size of troops, from 2 to 3
  companies, will be immediately dispatched to the
  region of conflict after such conflict has
  ensued.
• Maximum duration of troop staying time would be 3
  months. UNRRF would start returning home as soon
  as volunteers/reserves arrive.
• RRF would be trained as one unit at various
  training sites, one in each region. Training
  sites would be inside voluntary countries that do
  not send troops abroad. Training the RRF as one
  unit will help to increase the esprit de corps
  between soldiers during any peacekeeping
  operations.
• The Rapid Response will be able to engage in
  combat at digression of the commander 1. When
  the force itself is in danger because of
  combative hostility of any belligerents
• 2. When violence breaks out between belligerents
  and the commander deems it necessary to intervene
  in order to quell the violence by means of force.
• Commander should be held responsible for his
  actions by trial for unnecessary conflict.
• The Rapid Response should remain neutral at any
  time, only engaging in combat in aforementioned
  occasions.

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UN Volunteer Force (UNVF)

• UNVF is the continuation of the present UN Peace
  Keeping Force, UNPKF. As the name reveals, the
  force is supplied by volunteered nations. Whether
  they are in the pool or not does not matter.
• UNVF under our plan would go after the UNRRF has
  set the stage in order to decrease the
  casualties and increase its ability as a peace
  keeping force.
• Volunteer Force retains the current structure.

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UN Reserve Force (UNRF)

• UNRF would be supplied by the 3 nations that are
  chosen by the OCS.
• Basically a back-up for the volunteers, UNRF
  would be used to soothe any kind of difficulties
  coming from lack of troops or resources.
• Training of UNRF would take place in each
  respective home country providing troops for the
  UNRF under supervision of the representatives of
  the Training Department. The countries pledging
  to provide troops for the UNRF would not need to
  hold training sessions for their soldiers until
  ordered by the Security Council. The use of the
  UNRRF and Volunteer forces would buy time for
  this training to take place.
• When needed the UNRF would be organized into at
  most 4 armies and 4 areas to oversee Europe and
  Latin America, Africa I, Africa II, and Asia and
  Middle East. Each unit will be made up of land
  division, naval division, and air division. Total
  number of UNRF troops would be 20,00024,000.
• Considering the difficulties that international
  society has faced in Bosnia that were partially
  caused by lack of troops, Reserved Forces would
  be widely used in Peace Keeping Operations

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Security After a Conflict

• Once the Office of Military Affairs decides to
  pull out the Volunteer or Reserve troops, the
  Office of Rule Law and Security can choose to
  send in a policing unit.

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Structural Reform

• Creation of Office of Country Selection
• Creation of an independent Training Division
• Elimination of Force Generation Service
• Creation of an independent Policy and Evaluation
  Division

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The Organization in One
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Organization of the Office of Military Affairs
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Training Division
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Training Division (UNPKF-TD)

• The responsibility of the TD is to provide
  cultural, tactical, and disciplinary training to
  the UNPKF.
• Representatives would be sent to each country
  that is sending troops to the UNPKF to oversee
  that the training coincides with committee
  standards.

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Office of Country Selection (UNOCS)

• Members would be elected by the General Assembly
  every 20 years. There shall be no restrictions
  for any nations that are willing to serve.
• Under OCS, Committee of Selected Countries will
  give the countries an open forum to express their
  concerns.

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Department of Field Support (UNPKF-DFS)

• The DFS would deal with the logistics, budget and
  finance, field personnel, and technology and
  communications.
• The creations of the DFS would will work with the
  already existing Logistics Support Division (LSD)
  to help to organize aid directly for the troops.
• The Department of Field Support will also be able
  to directly work with peacekeeping volunteer
  organizations who wish to send food or supplies
  to troops.

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Office of Policy and Evaluation

• Best Practices Committee will send
  representatives to nations where peacekeeping is
  taking place to oversee that practices are to UN
  standards
• The office also integrates new practices from
  lessons learned from previous peacekeeping
  operations.

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